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The main  objective  of  the  present  dissertation  was  a  preliminary  analysis  of  the
new regulatory package of Basel III, namely, a first analysis of the Liquidity Coverage
Ratio computation, its practical application and its benefits for liquidity risk
management in financial institutions.
For this purposes, it was selected a sample of 5 Portuguese financial institutions
which, as at 31 December 2012, represented the most relevant financial institutions with
retail banking activities (Portuguese “banking market”).
Considering the average Liquidity Coverage Ratio obtained it was possible to
observe that the Portuguese “banking market” started to present a Liquidity Coverage
Ratio clearly above the Basel III minimum requirement (60%). The Liquidity Coverage
Ratio obtained by the Portuguese “banking market” insofar was 102% for 2013.
In a simulated stress scenario, we were able to verify that the minimum which
Portuguese “banking market” high quality liquidity assets stock could drop was
approximately 59% of its value, at 31st of  December  2013,  and  still  maintain  the
conditions to fulfil the Basel III minimum requirement (60%).
According to all the analysis performed, it was possible to conclude that the
Portuguese “banking market” has the ability to efficiently sustain, any financial stress
scenario. Therefore, holds sufficient stock of high quality liquidity assets that could be
easily and immediately converted into cash (in private markets) in order to sustain a
significant market volatility or stress scenarios lasting over 30 calendar days.
Moreover, given the analysis and conclusions inferred, we were able to verify that
the Portuguese “banking market” has a low liquidity risk profile and, consequently, in
light with the Base III new liquidity requirements, it is well prepared for financial stress
scenarios.
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Introduction
The subprime crisis in 2007 changed the financial market way of functioning, as a
consequence, it provoked a systemic crisis which affected all the major financial
markets of the world, mainly in the American and European markets, causing also a dry
up in the interbank lending market. As a result, the international community, in
particular the institutions that regulated the markets, felt the urge to produce new and
more efficient legislation and rules in order to prevent a new world crisis.
The solution presented by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(hereinafter “BCBS”) in  2010  was,  amongst  others,  the  Basel  III  agreement  which
regulated the liquidity requirements for the banks and financial institutions. We can
safely say that this original agreement was very rigorous in the limits and requirements
that the institutions had to follow (Hartlage, 2012). The first chapter of the dissertation
will present a literature review on this theme and try to explain the economic, social and
political context of the agreement, with emphasis upon the 2007 international crisis. The
second chapter will contextualize the advent of the agreement and in the third chapter
we will present the data available from the 5 major banks in Portugal, concerning the
liquidity values and rates in order to analyze the impact of the new regulations imposed
by the Basel III.
Finally we will make a data compilation of the official documents and statistics,
as  well  as  (inter)  national  documents  and  projections,  in  order  to  achieve  a




“The word liquidity has so many facets that is often counter-productive to use it without further
and closer definition” (Goodhart, 2008).
1.1 Liquidity risk definition
The liquidity risk arises because revenues and outlays are not synchronized
(Holmström & Tirole, 1998). This would not matter if the agents could issue financial
contracts to third parties, pledging their future income as collateral. However, in reality
this is not always possible and agents may become illiquid since the risk of liquidity
means the ability to settle obligations immediately (Drehmann & Nikolaou, 2010).
Consequently, a bank is illiquid if it is unable to fulfill his obligations. In legal terms, a
bank is then in default. In this sense, we define funding liquidity risk as the possibility
that over a specific horizon the bank will become unable to settle obligations
immediately.
Liquidity risk management is a part of the larger risk management framework of
the financial services industry, which concerns all financial institutions (Zhang, 2011).
Studying liquidity risk management issues is critical and complex. Failure to address the
matter may lead to dire consequences, including banking collapse, and by extension, the
instability  of  the  financial  system.  In  fact,  most  of  the  bank  failures  are  due  to  issues
around liquidity risk management. The author added that this is also the reason why
regulators are very concerned with the liquidity of financial institutions and additionally
why many financial industry professionals believe that the current thinking of regulators
appears to be focused on the strengthening of the liquidity framework.
1.2 The crisis of 2007 and the background to the Basel III: pre-2007
liquidity management
The liquidity management is an aspect which belongs to the everyday life of the
banking system and it results from the fact that banks finance long-term loans and other
assets with short-term liabilities, such as deposits, and also because banks need to
ensure that they have enough liquidity to sustain the day-to-day deposits and
withdrawals. Since there is the possibility of the deposits being withdrawn at any time,
the banks need to manage their liquidity to ensure that they can satisfy deposit
withdrawals without being forced to liquidate long-term capital, in this case gross loans.
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The liquidity management method more traditionally applied by commercial banks is
the use of interbank lending and high liquidity securities (i.e.: US treasuries bonds) to
guard against liquidity shocks (Campello, Giambona, & Graham, 2011; Riddiough &
Wu, 2009; Cornetta, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011; Slovik & Cournèd, 2011).
Starting in late 1990’s and increasing as we get closer to the mid-2000’s, the
management of liquidity in commercial banks changed dramatically in order to keep up
with the quick changes and new demands of the market (Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund, &
Willen, 2008). These changes occurred mainly in the largest US banks, European banks
and emerging financial institutions, which perform activities as a bank, but outside the
scope of traditional banking regulation and supervision. The changes involve new types
of assets and a more pronounced use of liabilities in very short term as sources of
liquidity, which ultimately contributed to the crisis that affected all financial and
economic market. Financial institutions have invested in bonds anchored in safe assets
(asset-backed securities – ABS). Although ABS assets are liquid during economy
expansionary phases, and even in mild recessions, they have become illiquid during the
financial crisis, contributing to the lack of liquidity of the financial institutions (Gerardi,
Lehnert, Sherlund, & Willen, 2008).
Cash flows of such securities assets are supported by a set of loans administered
by the banks and the transformation of individual loans (illiquid) in ABS assets was
driven by technological and scientific advances occurred in the financial area. Although
the ultimate goal was to distribute these titles to other participants and elements of the
financial markets, many financial institutions have kept the real estate assets at their
charge, for investment purposes and liquidity, especially in cases where they had high
credit rates, since the high rates of the assets assured with some security that the holders
would sell them or use them as collateral in repurchase agreements (operations in which
an ABS is sold for money and the seller agrees to buy it back in the future). However,
since the default rates of underlying assets (in particular mortgages) began to increase
these titles have become illiquid and as a consequence banks could no longer use them
as a significant source of liquidity, which led to the fragility of the financial system
(Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund, & Willen, 2008).
Simultaneously, the largest financial institutions have increased their dependence
on short-term financing and the most important sources of such funding were
repurchase agreements and the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). The latter
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consisted of short-term obligations, backed up by cash flow from assets such as ABS.
Knowing this facts we can understand how the system became dependent of this kind of
assets and consequently more fragile. In reality, the increasing dependence on these
types of funding sources is directly connected with the growth of ABS. Therefore the
marketing of ABS has created a growing reserve of liquid assets that could be used as
collateral for short-term loans, making them important financing instruments. Financial
institutions demand on this type of funding arose because traditional deposits practice
was insufficient to finance the expansion of credit that occurred before the 2007 crisis
(Perotti & Suarez, 2011). This increase in demand was satisfied by non-financial
corporations and institutional investors who have used these types of financing as ways
to save and apply its growing cash reserves (Pozsar, 2011). In fact, these were good
short term investments because they served as deposits which could be redeemed very
quickly and were endowed with high collateral rate offering a quick, allegedly safe,
turnover.
As it was demonstrated in the recent financial crisis, to trust these sources to
finance long-term investments can be very risky since the increased rates on the
subprime mortgage market in the first half of 2007 made investors remain uncertain
about the value of the subprime mortgage-backed securities. The uncertainty has
reached a high point in August 2007, when investors became fearful and consequently
stopped buying this type of funding. With that they stopped financing the actions of the
financial institutions operating with these financing instruments. In turn, these financial
institutions very rapidly began to suffer a severe shortage of liquidity and were forced to
find a replacement for these financial instruments in order to avoid bankruptcy. The
result was a collapse in interbank funding markets, leading to a response from the US
Federal Reserve and other central banks in order to bring more liquidity to the financial
system, avoiding in that way the collapse of the entire system. Due to the increase of
losses on subprime mortgages and the collapse of the housing market at the end of
2007, even the "safe" instruments of financing (referred above) started failing and could
only be rescued by lower values (Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund, & Willen, 2008).
Finally, the downfall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 triggered a large-
scale systemic crisis, during which other major US institutions like Wachovia and
Washington Mutual collapsed after suffering the executions and bailouts by its
creditors. In this way, the systemic crisis in the financial markets was followed by a
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period of great recession in the United States and a major economic downturn on a
global scale, affecting the economy of the entire planet (Sun, Stewart, & Pollard, 2011).
1.3 Theory that supports the liquidity management
The recent crisis and recession have suggested the need for a new, improved and
greater regulation of liquidity mechanisms in the financial markets and also showed
how the liquidity risk in a relatively small segment of the system, in this specific case
the subprime mortgage market, could culminate in a liquidity problem in the entire
financial system, a credit crisis and a severe, long, global recession. A prominent
approach to regulate liquidity in the financial sector requires a buffer of liquid assets
that financial institutions can use in an event of a liquidity crisis, preventing the spread
of the problem, and dealing immediately with the situation (Slovik & Cournèd, 2011).
A good example of that  is  the case of Lehman Brothers,  who claimed to have a
"fortress" of liquidity of approximately $ 40 billion in cash and liquid assets on a
balance sheet of approximately $ 700 billion (Valukas, 2010; Kowalik, 2013). However,
the liquidity reserves of Lehman Brothers were quickly depleted to pay the creditors
who had become increasingly uncertain about the company's ability to meet its
obligations. Therefore, without their own liquid assets and unable to obtain additional
liquidity from foreign investors, Lehman Brothers was unable to answer for its debt
obligations and officially declared bankruptcy (Valukas, 2010; Kowalik, 2013).
What the Lehman Brothers called liquidity "fortress" was clearly not enough to
avert its failure, which lead to their complete breakdown and the costs of their collapse
were extended to everyone through the general financial crisis (Kowalik, 2013). The
liquidity buffers can reduce the risk of systemic crises through: i) liquidity can make the
institutions less vulnerable to redemptions made by creditors because the buffers
increase the confidence of creditors in the capacity of institutions to meet their
obligations (Hartlage, 2012); ii) large reserves of liquid assets can decrease the
dependency of the institutions on sales of assets as a means to obtain liquidity (Hartlage,
2012); iii) if institutions experiencing a situation of liquidity risk, liquidity buffers can
give the management team the needed time to find solutions to their liquidity needs
(BCBS, 2010); and iv) liquidity buffers reduce the necessity of the financial institutions
in the central banks as suppliers of liquidity in times of crisis (Kowalik, 2013).
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When institutions forestall that a central bank will supply liquidity in times of
crisis, they have less encouragement to maintain their own liquidity buffers. This
reduces the incentives of institutions to manage their own liquidity cautiously in good
times, which in turn increases the prospect of a severe liquidity crisis and contribute to
financial instability (Farhi & Tirole, 2012).
1.4 Original Basel III Agreement
When the BCBS (2010) issued the Basel III agreement in December 2010, it was
defined that financial institutions need to maintain liquidity buffers of a size that would
be defined by each institution in accordance with a measure called the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (hereinafter, “LCR”). LCR is the ratio of the value of the shares of
high-quality liquid assets (hereinafter, “HQLA”) for an estimated value of the total
value of the institution and the institution's cash liquidity, on a hypothetical scenario
with  30  days  duration  (BCBS,  2010).  Thus  the  LCR was  calibrated  to  ensure  that  the
institution would have sufficient liquid assets to meet its liquidity needs. The assets that
institutions could use as part of the reserve would have necessarily to be liquid, even in
times of great pressure and crisis, ideally eligible as collateral for central banks. The
assets  can  be  divided  into  two  categories  (BCBS,  2010):  i)  level  1  assets  –  such  as
central bank reserves, money that can be drawn during crises, and low-risk sovereign
debt – could be included in the reserve without limit; and ii) level 2 assets – which
would include higher-risk sovereign debt and highly rated corporate bonds, that could
make up to 40 percent of the reserve, after discounting 15 percent in its market value.
The dimensions used to calculate the LCR of one institution were defined as the
difference between the input and output flows of liquidity. The outputs are the liquidity
resulting  from liabilities  of  a  financial  institution,  such  as  deposits  and  other  forms  of
obligation, as well as lines of credit. For each category of responsibility or commitment
that could force a way out of liquidity,  the amount to be carried out by the institution
would be multiplied by a rate estimated by the BCBS (2010).
Another important demanding dimension of the original Basel III agreement was
the rules associated to the use of the buffers by the institutions and the agreement
stipulated that the buffer could be released in a stress scenario. However, they also
required that the institutions would have to maintain their LCR at levels equal to or
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greater than 1 at all times. Consequently, institutions would have been able to use the
buffer only if their LCR had been greater than 1 (Kowalik, 2013; BCBS, 2010).
1.5 Basel III Revision
When Basel III conditions were first issued in 2010, the BCBS committed to
evaluate the use of the LCR during a first period and reviewing its effects on the
financial markets. During the subsequently three years the banking industry and experts
on the matter produced a series of comments and recommendations. In January 2013 the
BCBS issued the revised Basel III agreement (Kowalik, 2013).
The mainstream view was that the original provisions of the agreement were too
stern and would force some financial institutions to cut in some of their financial
products available for the retail customers. Other specialists defended that the
requirement to keep the LCR above 1 at all times meant that this instrument would be
many times useless, since the institutions could only use it in very limited scenarios in
order to respect the impositions (Slovik & Cournèd, 2011; Kowalik, 2013).
The revisions on the Basel III agreement introduced several important changes,
mainly affecting buffers’ size, composition, and availability (BCBS, 2010). First of all,
the revision inserted the run-off rate lowering from 5% to 3%, which reflected an
evaluation that pointed that the initial estimates of run-off rates were disproportionately
high. Secondly, the revisions changed the composition of the buffer by adding a new
asset category – Level 2B: lower-rated corporate debt and common equity shares, both
discounted from their market value by 50%, and certain residential MBS, discounted by
25% –  and  this  assets  must  not  comprise  more  than  15% of  the  total  stock  of  HQLA
(Kowalik, 2013).
1.6 Comparison of the main changes in the 2013 review:
Effectiveness and improvements
When we refer to the effectiveness of the LCR in regulating liquidity buffers, the
authors (Alloway & Bullock, 2013; Kowalik, 2013; Slovik & Cournèd, 2011) mention
three main factors.
·The size of the buffers: For a liquidity buffer to be effective its size should
mirror an institution’s liquidity necessities in a crisis. However, determining these
liquidity needs may be very trying mainly because i) legislators face considerable
16
uncertainty in the evaluation of the institutions future liquidity necessities and also
there is no information about institutions behavior and consequently their future
needs, in an environment where liquidity regulation is in place, making the
assessment of liquidity needs particularly challenging. Moreover since ii) the
liquidity needs of individual institutions rest on the institutions specific
characteristics, such as the arrangement of their obligations and capital, their risk
profile, size, business activities and the various environments in which they
operate. Dimensions which are very difficult to assess with the approach
presented by the Basel III model, henceforth under such model, a well-diversified
institution (less susceptible to liquidity shocks) bears the same cost of insuring
against liquidity shocks as a less-diversified institution (more susceptible to
liquidity shocks). This methodology might have further adversarial consequences,
for instance, it might encourage well-diversified institutions to take on superior
risk to compensate for the fact that their diversification is not compensated with a
lower liquidity buffer.
In conclusion, an uncompromising approach to run-off and inflows rates opens the
likelihood that financial institutions may seek to exploit ambiguities in the
regulation, engaging in internal regulations in order to lower the cost of holding
liquidity buffers. An equal problem may surface with the classification of
liabilities that are subject to the LCR standard, with certain financial institutions
already devising strategies to avoid having certain liabilities classified as subject
to the LCR standard (Alloway & Bullock, 2013).
·The composition of the buffers: For liquidity buffers to achieve their role, the
assets that encompass the buffers have to be satisfactorily liquid at the time the
institution needs them. As a consequence, when choosing which assets may be
included in liquidity buffers, legislators need to achieve a balance between a
definition of eligible assets that is too all-encompassing and a definition that is too
narrow. On one hand, if the definition is too all-encompassing, a portion of the
liquidity buffer might not be liquid when needed, on the other hand, if the
definition of eligible assets is too narrow, financial institutions may face an
inadequate supply of such assets resulting in several consequences. In order to
reduce the scope for some of these limitations, the new Basel provisions widened
the  definition  of  suitable  assets,  not  only  reducing  the  mandatory  total  of  liquid
assets for regulatory purposes by lowering some of the run-off rates but also
allowing financial institutions to use more classes of assets (Level 2B).
·The availability  of  the  buffers  in  crisis: Another crucial requirement for well-
functioning liquidity buffers is that they must be available to institutions when
they need them, else institutions will have to maintain an additional liquidity
buffer for handling their regular liquidity needs. Additionally, institutions not
allowed to use the regulatory buffer would have to resort to the same means of
obtaining liquidity as if they had no regulatory buffer.
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The original Basel III requirements stated that institutions would have to maintain
the LCR above 1 in all situations including during a crisis. Nevertheless, in the 2013
revisions it was acknowledged that such requirement had to be plunged in order to
allow banks to use the buffer in phases of stress. As a consequence, the national
superintendents were given freedom of choice about the use of buffers and how they
would respond to the banks use of their buffers.
1.7 Basel III – LCR Methodology
The new regulatory package of Basel III is the first comprehensive framework for
the regulation of the liquidity risk. This new regulation helps to mitigate the
externalities imposed on the rest of the financial system (and, ultimately, on the real
economy) arising from excessive maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities.
The need to regulate the liquidity risk was perhaps one of the most important
lessons of the global financial crisis. The proposals in the Basel III package represented
an important step in this process, by defining a harmonized set of rules for international
banks.
This creates the necessary regulation for the banks to be able to reduce imbalances
maturity structure and avoid excessive reliance on short-term financing incentives.
In  addition,  banks  will  have  to  hold  a  significant  amount  of  HQLA  which  will
allow them to react more easily to unexpected liquidity shocks without resulting in
immediate asset sales.
Despite this remarkable progress, there is an element that may be missing in the
new framework: the regulation of systemic component of liquidity risk. At this respect
(IMF, 2011) "(…) the risk of systemic liquidity is the trend that financial institutions have to
collectively underestimate liquidity risk in periods of financial stability, as they assume that the central
bank will likely intervene in times of stress to maintain financial stability, avoid bankruptcy of financial
institutions and thus limit the impact of illiquidity and other financial institutions in the real economy.".
The regulation of liquidity risk can be justified by the fact that banks do not take
into account the social optimum when they optimize the relationship between risk and
return. The ex-ante regulation of bank liquidity can mitigate this behavior (Acharya et
al., 2011; Allen & Gale, 2004a & 2004b; Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Cao & Illing, 2010;
Gale & Yourlmazer, 2011; Holmstrom & Tirole, 1998; Rochet, 2004; Tirole, 2011).
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However, there is no consensus about the way to mitigate the liquidity risk, both
in academic and political regulatory framework, despite was achieved a remarkable
progress during the last years. Traditionally, reserve requirements on bank deposits was
the main tool for managing liquidity risk, though they also played an important role in
the implementation of monetary policy (Robitaille, 2011). Additionally, the deposit
guarantee systems are widely recognized as an important tool in preventing raising
deposits.
Some recent discussions have suggested the possibility of increasing capital
requirements to include liquidity risk (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). However, this
perspective is not consensual. As discussed, liquidity risk financing is partly related to
problems of asymmetric information about the creditworthiness of banks (Ratnovski,
2007).
Increasing the solvency without reducing the problem of asymmetric information
would not reduce refinancing risk (Perotti & Suarez, 2011).
Several authors have discussed the importance of holding a liquidity buffer. In a
recent article it was discussed the trade-offs between the imposition of quantitative
requirements for risk liquidity and improving the incentives of the customers as the last
resource  of  the  system (Ratnovski,  2009).  In  the  same article,  the  author  said  that  the
quantitative requirements can help banks to achieve the optimal level of liquidity and is
therefore a more efficient solution.
However, the transparency appears to be a critical problem in this case
(Ratnovski, 2007). There are many other contributions in academic literature that point
to the possibility of imposing minimum buffers of liquid assets (Acharya et al., 2011;
Allen & Gale, 2004a & 2004b; Farhiet al., 2009; Gale & Yorulmazer, 2011; Rochet &
Vives, 2004; Tirole, 2011; Vives, 2011). However, other authors: (Wagner, 2007b)
showed that, paradoxically, holding more liquid assets may induce greater risk to the
banks; (Freixas et al., 2011) showed that central banks can manage interest rates in
order to induce banks to hold more liquid assets, i.e., monetary policy can help promote
financial stability.
There were other authors (Turn & Bengui, 2010) found arguments to support a tax
on short-term debt, while other (Cao & Illing, 2011) showed that ex-ante imposition of
minimum liquidity requirements for banks is a key condition for sustainability policies
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of  customer  as  the  last  resource  of  the  system.  Finally,  (Diamond  &  Rajan,  2005;
Wagner, 2007a) analyzed ex-post interventions.
In this context, the new regulatory framework of Basel III is essentially based on
the definition of minimum buffers of liquid assets and restrictions on financial
institutions short-term funding. Overall, the regulation of the liquidity risk was perhaps
one of the most overlooked aspects before the financial crisis, with the lack of
internationally harmonized rules (Rochet, 2008). However, the role played by liquidity
during the global financial crisis made it clear that an international framework of this
regulation is necessary. In December 2010, the BCBS (2010) released the final version
of this new international framework for regulating liquidity risk, which is an important
part of the new Basel III regulatory package. This new regulation creates the necessary
incentives for banks to maintain adequate liquidity buffers and not rely excessively on
short-term financing.
1.7.1. Objective and relevance for financial markets
LCR was developed by the BCBS (2013)1 in order to turn the banks into more
resilient financial institutions through the development of a ratio that allows the
assessment of the short-term resilience of their liquidity risk profile.
BCBS (2013) paragraph 14 states that this ratio allows the supervision,
assessment and monitoring of the liquidity risk profile of banks by ensuring that they
have sufficient HQLA – assets that can be converted easily and immediately in private
markets into cash – to sustain a significant stress scenario or market volatility lasting
over 30 calendar days.
This LCR is an important tool in risk liquidity supervision, assessment and
monitoring by the supervisor entities of each bank as an internal management ratio,
assuming that it will allow improving the banking sector´s ability to absorb shocks
arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk
of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy.
To be noted that BCBS (2013) refers that the LCR is, individually, insufficient to
measure  all  dimensions  of  a  bank´s  liquidity  profile.  In  this  sense,  BCBS  (2013)
1
On the path of reform introduced by Basel III.
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developed a set of monitoring tools to further strengthen and promote global
consistency in liquidity risk supervision, tools which are supplementary to the LCR.
The objective is the introduction of the LCR as a mandatory monitoring for
supervision entities (and as such, for banks) on the 1st January 2015, in a graduated
approach, with the minimum requirement set at 60% and increases in equal annual steps
to reach 100% on the 1st January 2019. This graduate approach, coupled with the
revisions made to the 2010 publication of the liquidity standards, is designed to ensure
that the LCR can be introduced without material disruption allowing an order
strengthening of the banking systems or the ongoing financing of economic activity.
The Committee established that, individual countries that are receiving financial
support for macroeconomic and structural reform purposes may choose a different
implementation schedule for their national banking systems, consistent with the design
of their broader economic restructuring programs.
As already referred, the LCR aims to ensure that a bank has an adequate free stock
of HQLA that consists of cash or assets that can be converted into cash at little or no
loss of value in private markets, to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day
liquidity stress scenario.
BCBS  (2013)  paragraph  16  states  that,  at  a  minimum  the  free  stock  of  HQLA
should  enable  the  bank  to  sustain  on  a  short  term  (thirty  days)  in  case  of  a  stress
scenario, time that is assumed as necessary to take the appropriate corrective actions by
management and supervisors in an order way. Furthermore, it gives the Central Bank
additional time to take appropriate measures, if they find it necessary. Accordingly to
paragraph  19  of  the  BCBS  (2013),  the  LCR  emerges  as  an  important  tool  for  the
monitoring of stressed scenarios2.
In accordance, from the supervisor point of view, LCR should be viewed as a
minimum supervisory requirement for banks.
2 Considering that it “(…) combined idiosyncratic and market-wide shock that would result in: (a) the run-off of a proportion of
retail deposits; (b) a partial loss of unsecured wholesale funding capacity; (c) a partial loss of secured, short-term financing with
certain collateral and counterparties; (d) additional contractual outflows that would arise from a downgrade in the bank’s public
credit rating by up to and including three notches, including collateral posting requirements; (e) increases in market volatilities that
impact the quality of collateral or potential future exposure of derivative positions and thus require larger collateral haircuts or
additional collateral, or lead to other liquidity needs; (f) unscheduled draws on committed but unused credit and liquidity facilities
that the bank has provided to its clients; and (g) the potential need for the bank to buy back debt or honour non-contractual
obligations in the interest of mitigating reputational risk.”.
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The Committee defines that the LCR should be assessed based in the division of
the value of the stock of HQLA in stressed conditions by the total net cash outflows,
calculated according to the scenario parameters outlined below, as follows:
LCR =
Stock of HQLA
Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days
Being a traditional liquidity coverage ratio, the LCR methodology should be used
internally by banks to assess exposure to contingent liquidity events. The total net cash
outflows for the scenario are to be calculated for the next 30 calendar days.
The standard requires that, in case of an absent financial stress situation, the value
of the ratio should not be lower than 100%, meaning that the stock of HQLA should at
least be equal to the total net cash outflows in order to serve as a defense against the
potential effect of liquidity stress.
However, during a period of financial stress, the banks may use their stock of
HQLA and consequently their LCR will be below 100%. Maintaining the LCR below
100% could produce negative effects on the bank and other market participants.
1.7.2. Stock of HQLA
As referred above, the numerator of the LCR is the stock of HQLA.
Under the BCBS (2013) standard banks must hold a stock of free stock HQLA to
cover the total net cash outflows over a 30 calendar day period under a potential stress
scenario.
In order to qualify as HQLA, assets should be liquid in markets during a period of
stress and, ideally, be central bank eligible. Additionally, assets are considered to be
HQLA if they can be easily and immediately converted into cash at little or no loss of
value which depends on the underlying stress scenario, the volume to be monetized and
the timeframe considered.
22
Additionally, paragraph 24 of BCBS (2013) states that the characteristics that an
asset must have in order to be considered as HQLA3.
Despise the characteristics mentioned above, paragraph 46 of the BCBS (2013)
defines that there are two categories of assets that can be included in the stock:
· Level 1 – Assets can comprise an unlimited share of the share pool and are not
subject to a haircut under the LCR (HQLA should be measured at an amount no
greater than their current market value). National supervisors may require
haircuts for Level 1 securities based on, among other things, their duration,
credit and liquidity risk, and typical repo haircuts; and
· Level 2 – Assets (comprising Level 2A assets and any Level 2B assets permitted
by the supervisor) can be included in the stock of HQLA, subject to the
requirement that they comprise no more than 40% of the overall stock after
haircuts have been applied.
1.7.3. Total net cash outflows
Total net cash outflows is defined as the total expected cash outflows minus total
expected cash inflows in the specified stress scenario for the subsequent 30 calendar
days. It is calculated by multiplying the outstanding balances of various categories or
types of liabilities and off-balance sheet commitments by the rates at which they are
expected to run off or be drawn down. Total expected cash inflows are calculated by
multiplying the outstanding balances of various categories of contractual receivables by
3 “(i) Fundamental characteristics
 Low risk: assets that are less risky tend to have higher liquidity. High credit standing of the issuer and a low degree of
subordination increase an asset’s liquidity. Low duration: low legal risk, low inflation risk and denomination in a convertible
currency with low foreign exchange risk all enhance an asset’s liquidity. Ease and certainty of valuation: an asset’s liquidity
increases if market participants are more likely to agree on its valuation. Assets with more standardised, homogenous and simple
structures tend to be more fungible, promoting liquidity. The pricing formula of a high-quality liquid asset must be easy to calculate
and not depend on strong assumptions. The inputs into the pricing formula must also be publicly available. In practice, this should
rule out the inclusion of most structured or exotic products. Low correlation with risky assets: the stock of HQLA should not be
subject to wrong-way (highly correlated) risk. For example, assets issued by financial institutions are more likely to be illiquid in
times of liquidity stress in the banking sector. Listed on a developed and recognised exchange: being listed increases an asset’s
transparency.
(ii) Market-related characteristics
Active and sizable market: the asset should have active outright sale or repo markets at all times. This means that: There should be
historical evidence of market breadth and market depth. This could be demonstrated by low bid-ask spreads, high trading volumes,
and a large and diverse number of market participants. Diversity of market participants reduces market concentration and
increases the reliability of the liquidity in the market. There should be robust market infrastructure in place. The presence of
multiple committed market makers increases liquidity as quotes will most likely be available for buying or selling HQLA. Low
volatility: Assets whose prices remain relatively stable and are less prone to sharp price declines over time will have a lower
probability of triggering forced sales to meet liquidity requirements. Volatility of traded prices and spreads are simple proxy
measures of market volatility. There should be historical evidence of relative stability of market terms (eg prices and haircuts) and
volumes during stressed periods. Flight to quality: historically, the market has shown tendencies to move into these types of assets
in a systemic crisis. The correlation between proxies of market liquidity and banking system stress is one simple measure that could
be used.”
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the rates at which they are expected to flow in under the scenario up to an aggregate cap
of 75% of total expected cash outflows.
1.7.3.1. Cash outflows
The Committee established in the paragraph 73 of the BCBS (2013) that cash
outflows that should be considered to LCR computation are as follows:
·Retail deposits run-off: Deposits placed in a bank by a citizen and deposits from
legal entities, sole proprietorships or partnerships are captured in wholesale
deposit categories4;
·Unsecured wholesale funding run-off: Liabilities and general obligations that
are raised from non-citizens (i.e. legal entities, including sole proprietorships and
partnerships) and are not collateralized by legal rights to specifically designated
assets owned by the borrowing institution in the case of bankruptcy, insolvency,
liquidation or resolution. Additionally, can be considered obligations related to
derivative contracts are explicitly excluded from this definition5;
·Secured funding run-off: Liabilities and general obligations that are
collateralized by legal rights to specifically designated assets owned by the
borrowing institution in the case of bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation or
resolution6;
·Additional requirements:
§ Derivatives cash outflows7;
§ Increased liquidity needs related to downgrade triggers embedded in
financing transactions, derivates and other contracts8;
§ Increased liquidity needs related to the potential for valuation changes on
posted collateral securing derivate and other transactions9;
§ Increased liquidity needs related to excess non-segregated collateral held by
the bank that could contractually be called at any time by the counterparty10;
§ Increased liquidity needs related to contractually required collateral on
transactions for which the counterparty has not yet demanded the collateral
be posted11;
4 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 74 up to 84 of the BCBS (2013).
5 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 85 up to 111 of the BCBS (2013).
6 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 112 up to 114 of the BCBS (2013).
7 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 115 up to 116 of the BCBS (2013).
8 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 118 of the BCBS (2013).
9 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 119 of the BCBS (2013).
10 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 120 of the BCBS (2013).
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§ Increased liquidity needs related to contracts that allow collateral
substitution to non-HQLA assets12;
§ Increased liquidity needs related to market valuation changes on derivative
or other transactions13;
§ Loss of funding on asset-backed securities, covered bonds and other
structured financing instruments14;
§ Loss of funding on asset-backed commercial paper, conduits, securities
investment vehicles and other such financing facilities;
§ Drawdowns on committed credit and liquidity facilities15;
§ Other contingent funding obligations16;
§ Contractual obligations to extend funds within a 30-day period17;
§ Other contingent funding obligations18;
§ Non contractual obligations where customer short positions are covered by
other customers’ collateral19;
§ Other contractual cash outflows20.
1.7.3.2. Cash inflows
The Committee established in the paragraph 142 of the BCBS (2013) that cash
inflows that should be considered to LCR computation are as follows:
·Cap on total inflows: In order to prevent banks from relying solely on anticipated
inflows to meet their liquidity requirement, and also to ensure a minimum level of
HQLA holdings, the amount of inflows that can offset outflows is capped at 75%
of total expected cash outflows as calculated in the standard. This requires that a
bank must  maintain  a  minimum amount  of  stock  of  HQLA equal  to  25% of  the
total cash outflows, such as:
§ Secured lending, including reverse repos and securities borrowing21;
§ Committed facilities22;
§ Other inflows by counterparty23;
11 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 121 of the BCBS (2013).
12 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 122 of the BCBS (2013).
13 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 123 of the BCBS (2013).
14 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 124 of the BCBS (2013).
15 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 125 of the BCBS (2013).
16 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 126 up to 131 of the BCBS (2013)
17 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 132 up to 133 of the BCBS (2013)
18 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 134 up to 139 of the BCBS (2013)
19 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 140 of the BCBS (2013)
20 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 141 of the BCBS (2013)
21 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 145 up to 148 of the BCBS (2013)
22 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 149 of the BCBS (2013)
23 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 150 up to 157 of the BCBS (2013)
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§ Other cash inflows24.
1.8. Key challenges for financial institutions
Financial institutions with a strategy focused on extensive short-term funding or
with insufficient HQLA may face important operating costs when meeting the new
liquidity requirements.
In order to produce LCR, financial institutions would most likely have to adapt
their strategy to focus on Basel III requirements (Villafranca & Mohammed, 2013). The
authors continued by saying that financial institutions will have to adjust their balance
sheets, for instance and as already referred by:
·European Banking Authority (2013), holding more HQLA and measure the
encumbrance of the assets in order to reduce the level of structural subordination;
·European Banking Authority (2013), identifying deposits subject to higher
outflows via factors such as: volatility, volume, currency, location of deposits and
the relationship with customers;
·BCBS (2013), improving additional medium and long-term wholesale funding;
·BCBS (2010) said that global banks will have to manage both central and local
requirements to meet the Basel III requirements with a minimum impact on their
ability to move funding and liquidity;
·BCBS (2013) said that the implementation of Basel III requirements, would more
likely impact both business model and organizational structure of financial
institutions. Indeed, financial institutions will have to create stress and test
scenarios, meet new reporting requirements and model cash flows in order to
respond to the new liquidity requirements, thus financial institutions should
expect to face significant operating cost pressures in the short-term.
24 For further potential options for alternative treatment please see paragraphs 150 up to 160 of the BCBS (2013)
26
2. Methodology
On  the  first  chapter  of  this  dissertation,  we  started  with  an  explanation  of  the
Basel III agreement, explaining its conditions and requirements. We also made a brief
historical approach of the precedents to the Basel III agreement, focusing on the 2007
systemic crisis, with the objective of contextualizing the emergence of the agreement.
After the literature review, we will analyze the existing balance sheets and
liquidity  data  from  the  5  largest  banks  in  Portugal  (Caixa  Geral  de  Depósitos,  Banco
Espírito  Santo,  Banco  Santander  Totta,  Banco  Millenium  BCP,  e  BPI),  from  2005  to
2013. We will make this analysis in order to assess, and understand, the impact of the
Basel III conditions in these Portuguese banking institutions. This analysis will provide
us a view on the evolution of the banks financial condition and their capacity to adapt to
the measures imposed by the Basel III.
In our opinion, we define our dissertation as a data comparison study, by
compiling  the  official  data  available  on  the  banks,  comparing  it  with  the  data  prior  to
the implementation of the Basel III agreement and resume the major changes and
implications.
2.1. Type and sample database
The process of decision making needs, unquestionably, to have clear information
about the object under investigation, in order to be as efficient as possible (Costa &
Pimenta, 2004).
The sampling is the process of selection of the sample, in other words, a subset of
the population that corresponds to the set of elements on which you want to infer, which
allows to take the necessary inferences about the subject under investigation (Barbetta,
Bornia & Reis, 2004).
Summarizing, the sampling process should follow the following steps, which are
based on a sampling plan consisting of several phases, including (Costa & Pimenta,
2004): definition of the objects of investigation; the definition of the population;
identification, selection and analysis of existing information; the choice of the sampling
method; quantifying the sample; the choice of method of data collection; and the
presentation of results.
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The methodology that was applied in the present investigation was slightly
different, given the object of investigation and the nature of the sample needed to be
used. In this sense, below are defined all the steps performed in order to investigate the
object of the present investigation.
The main object under investigation is based on the perception of whether the
banks have sufficient stock of HQLA that can be converted easily and immediately in
private markets into cash, in order to sustain the significant market volatility or stress
scenarios  lasting  over  30  calendar  days  or  not.  This  analysis  will  allow  obtaining
information and further conclusions about the resilience of the liquidity risk profile of
the  banks  selected  for  this  purpose,  on  the  short-term  path  of  reform  introduced  by
Basel III.
The financial system comprises the set of financial institutions which are
essentially channeling savings into investment in the financial markets by buying and
selling financial products. These institutions ensure the operation of payment systems
allowing local markets to develop their activity and individuals and businesses to move
and act in distant places respectively. The absence of a well-structured banking system
would not allow the circulation of money and would make more difficult to create the
goods and services markets, as well as the movement of people and goods.
According to Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (APB)25, the number of financial
institutions – banks – in the Portuguese market was 34. However, out of the total
population of Portuguese financial institutions, was selected a sample of 5 financial
institutions which, as of 31.12.201226, represented the most relevant financial
institutions with retail banking activities27 (investment banking activities and other were
excluded from the present investigation) in the Portuguese “banking market”
considering the categories of assets and liabilities selected for this purpose (please see
section below). The financial institutions selected were: Banco BPI, S.A. (hereinafter
“BPI”); Banco Comercial Português, S.A. (hereinafter, “BCP”); Banco Espírito Santo,
25 Financial institutions exert different specific activities, in addition to the feature, allow to classify them based on their role. The
Legal Framework of Credit Institutions and Financial Companies (Legal Framework) splits the financial entities into two main
groups: Credit Institutions and Financial Companies.
26 Boletim Informativo n.º 48, 2012 – Anual, APB. Last information for the financial sector made available by BdP.
27 In fact, as at 31st December 2013, these 5 financial institutions represent 76% of the “Stock of HQLA” (items considered as stock
of HQLA for purposes of the present dissertation) and 56% of the “Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days” (items
considered as total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days for purposes of the present dissertation) of the sum of all
financial institutions. Please see tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 for further analysis.
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S.A. (hereinafter, “BES”); Caixa Geral de Depósitos, S.A. (hereinafter “CGD”); and
Banco Santander Totta, S.A. (hereinafter “STB”).
The timeframe of the analysis of this investigation are the economic exercises of
2005 to 2013.
After the subject population is defined, it is important to identify, select and
analyze the existing and necessary information so that we can infer about the object of
investigation, and a collection of statistical information is very important to ensure
consistency and assertiveness.
The selection of the sample should pursuit the object in investigation.
The method of data collection consists in a sampling process, which comprehends
the collection, coding, verification, analysis and interpretation of the desired
information.
This investigation was constructed based on data developed by APB which is built
on a yearly basis with aggregate information from all banks or similar institutions.
The data for this investigation was constructed through the balance sheet items
prepared for the purposes of recognition and measurement in accordance with
International Financial Standards Reporting (IFSR) issued by the Bank of Portugal and
on that date, and the data collected correspond to the individual activity of each target
database, thus contemplating the individual results and non-consolidated accounts.
This choice was due to the fact that, while the consolidated reporting (economic
group), the financial information available includes other impacts of activity, i.e., is one
that relates to the overall activity and not to the individual activity.
At this respect, to be noted that the year 2005 stands out as a profound regulatory
change regarding the presentation of accounts due to the implementation of IFSR,
materialized by the European Parliament and of the Council Regulation on July 19,
2002, which determines nationals companies, in respect of each year beginning on or
after January 1, 2005, companies with values securities admitted to trading on a
regulated market of any member state to prepare their consolidated accounts in
accordance with IFRS accounts standards.
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2.2. Liquidity Coverage Ratio – Harmonization
As already referred, the object under investigation is based on the investigation of
whether a sample of Portuguese financial institutions have sufficient stock HQLA that
can be converted easily and immediately in private markets into cash in order to sustain
the significant market volatility or stress scenarios lasting over 30 calendar days or not.
The standard requires that, absent a situation of financial stress, the value of the
ratio should not be lower than 100%, meaning that the stock of HQLA should at least
equal total net cash outflows in order to serve as a defense against the potential onset of
liquidity stress.
Also, as already referred, LCR monitoring will be mandatory for supervision
entities (and the such, is banks) from the 1st of January 2015, in a graduated approach,
with the minimum requirement set at 60% and rise in equal annual increases to reach
100%  on  the  1st of January 2019. However, for the investigation purposes it was
considered that the above mentioned graduated approach was already at its full
application, meaning that it was not considered any graduated approach and, therefore,
it was assumed a minimum LCR of 100% (explained in the next section).
The methodology used in the present investigation could not be (totally) based on
the BCBS (2013) methodology, due to many aspects and the difficulties encountered in
the course of this investigation.
The complexity of the methodology established by the BCBS (2013), specifically
regarding the definition of the stock of HQLA and total net cash outflows (which have
never been applied in practical examples and requires a more detailed explanation and
practice and beyond from that available).
Assuming that the methodology of the present investigation would be based, in
part, on methodology adopted by BCBS (2013), the gathering of the necessary
information would be extremely complex, namely due to the insufficient detail of the
information required and made available to the public consultation by the own banks.
In face of the above mentioned difficulties encountered in the course of this
investigation, we processed to the harmonization of the components of the LCR
indicator, as explained below. The data collected for all the economic years under
investigation were based on the following categories of assets and liabilities:
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· Assets
o Cash and deposits at central banks;
o Loans and advances to credit institutions;
o Loans and advances to credit institutions – other loans and advances;
o Financial assets held for trading;
o Financial assets available for sale.
· Liabilities
o Deposits from credit institutions;
o Deposits from central banks;
o Financial liabilities held for trading;
o Deposits from clients and other loans.
As regards to the stock of HQLA, although these items do not represent
(accurately) the stock of HQLA as defined in paragraph 24 of the BCBS (2013) we
believe that the above mentioned items are those that can represent more accurately the
stock of HQLA, considering their fundamental characteristics (low risk, easiness and
certainty of valuation, low correlation with risky assets) and their market-related
characteristics (active and sizable market, low volatility and flight to quality), as such
below:
· Cash and deposits at Central Banks: The balance Central Banks includes
deposits in the Central Bank to satisfy the legal requirements to maintain a cash
reserve for which the value is based on the value of deposits and other liabilities.
The cash reserve requirements, according to European Central Bank System for
Euro Zone, establishes the maintenance of a deposit with the Central Bank
equivalent to 1% of the average value of deposits and other liabilities, during
each reserve requirement period;
· Loans and advances to credit institutions – Repayable on demand: Deposits
placed in credit institutions, which are in order to cash and can be used at any
time;
· Loans and advances to credit institutions – Other loans and advances:
Deposits placed in credit institutions, which are the term cash but can be used at
any time; and
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· Financial assets held for trading and Financial assets available for sale: The
trading and available for sale portfolios, are recorded at fair value in accordance
with the accounting policy. The balance listed instruments includes securities
valued with stock exchange market prices, valued according to price providers
and securities listed in other organized markets.
As already mentioned for the case of the stock of HQLA, the items selected do not
represent (accurately) the total net cash flows as defined in BCBS (2013). However,
according to the characteristics defined in BCBS (2013), we believe that the above
mentioned items are those that can represent more accurately the total net cash flows,
considering their characteristics (the retail deposits run-off, the unsecured wholesale
funding run-off and the secured funding run-off), as such below:
· Deposits from credit institutions: Deposits from credit institutions, which are
in order to cash and can be used at any time;
· Deposits from central banks: Deposits from central banks, which are in order
to cash and can be used at any time;
· Financial liabilities held for trading: The trading and available for sale
portfolios, are recorded at fair value in accordance with the accounting policy.
The balance listed instruments includes securities valued at stock exchange
market prices, valued according to price providers and securities listed in other
organized markets; and
· Deposits from clients and other loans: Deposits from customers, which are in
order to cash and can be used at any time.
Besides the above mentioned methodology, to be noted that as those are balance
sheet items, they show the position of the bank´s balance sheets at the end of each
financial year.
In this sense, in order to harmonize the information required to compute the LCR,
as well as to comply with the rule of 30 calendar days, to all accounting items (i.e., for
each item, for each exercise and for each selected bank) was performed a preliminary
division of the items by 12 representing the monthly harmonization of the annual
amount discharged only in case of the Deposits from clients and other loans.
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2.3. Limitations and sampling errors
The method of collecting the data necessary for statistical inference presented may
be  susceptible  to  some  sampling  errors  (Costa  &  Pimenta,  2004).  In  this  sense,  it  is
relevant to point out potential errors arising from sampling methodology and
harmonization of the indicator used to analyze the effects of the object under
investigation.
The first potential error identified lies in collecting and coding information. This
point may cause some kind of bias in statistical analysis since, as already mentioned in
section  above,  the  indicator  used  for  purposes  of  this  investigation  suffered  an
adaptation in terms of their computation. Notwithstanding, that harmonized indicator
was carefully explained in the section above. In accordance to the explanation given
above, we believe that way misinterpretations are mitigated.
The second potential error is the inadequate coverage of the population (sample).
This potential error occurs when the representative elements are not included in the
sample  who  withdrew  the  universe.  This  might  cause  some  kind  of  bias  in  terms  of
statistical analysis as compared to the universe of companies operating in the domestic
market, will only be considered for purposes of this investigation a set of five financial
institutions,  as  already  referred.  So,  not  having  a  high  degree  of  coverage  of  the
universe in question may have little validity amplification of the results obtained when
taking the necessary inferences. However, the error identified becomes less important
considering the level of market representation which, has already mentioned, is large
due to the 5 financial institutions selected in the sampling process.
Finally,  the  third  potential  error  in  the  process  is  the  lack  of  response  of  some
statistical units in particular with regard to compliance of the 30 calendar days rule,
from which one can infer the impossibility of obtaining inferences and conclusions
about the elements of sample. Given this limitation, we believe that this matter could be
study in future investigations.
Considering the previously mentioned, it was possible to conclude that the sample
used to infer and make conclusions about the object of investigation has levels of
quality, appropriateness and clarity significant, which in turn ensures a coherent
framework for conducting the necessary statistical inferences.
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2.4. Hypothesis under investigation
The statistical inference is synonymous with statements about parameters of a
population, where such methods exist to validate or not to allow these same statements.
The authors still refer that statistical methods provide a contribution to the decision aid
level, allowing the manager to make a decision based in a statistical support, with the
error minimization.
In the case, pursuing the present dissertation objective, the hypothesis under
investigation was defined as follows:
· H0: LCR ≥ 60% - “The Portuguese financial institutions have sufficient stock of
HQLA in order to sustain the significant market volatility or stress scenarios
lasting over 30 calendar days”;
· H1: LCR < 60% - “The Portuguese financial institutions do not have sufficient
stock  of  HQLA  in  order  to  sustain  the  significant  market  volatility  or  stress
scenarios lasting over 30 calendar days”.
In fact, as we shall see, we performed several inferences, with the proper
adaptation of H0 and H1 above defined, namely, through the study of LCR in terms of
each individual financial institution in scope, its temporal evolution, as well as an
aggregate analysis of Portuguese banking system through an average LCR.
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2.5. Computation of data – LCR computation
The database that supports the present dissertation, previously identified, has the
items that were required for the measurement and computation of LCR, as follows:
+ Cash and deposits at the Central Banks
+ Loans and advances to credit institutions
+ Financial assets held for trading
+ Financial assets available for sale
LCR =
+ Deposits from credit institutions
+ Deposits from central banks
+ Financial liabilities held for trading




According to Basel III standards and to the methodology defined in the present
dissertation, the Portuguese financial institutions are considered to have sufficient stock
of  HQLA  if  their  LCR  is  above  60%.  As  already  referred,  this  means  that  the
institutions in scope had, in the period under analysis, sufficient stock of HQLA in order
to sustain a significant market volatility or stress scenarios lasting over 30 calendar
days.
Considering the reported values by the financial institutions for the stock of
HQLA and for  the  total  net  cash  outflows  over  the  next  30  calendar  days  (please  see
Table 7 and Table 8, respectively), we were able to compute the LCR for each financial
institution in scope and for every period under analysis (please see Table 9), according
to the methodology defined in the previous section.
LCR values are presented in table 9, which is composed by (i) the LCR for each
Portuguese financial institution in scope for all the periods under analysis, (ii) as well as
the arithmetic mean of LCR for each financial institution during the analyzed period,
and also (iii) the arithmetic mean of the LCR of the “banking market” for each period
under analysis.
We believe that the last indicator above mentioned – the arithmetic mean of the
LCR of the “banking market” for each period under analysis – could represent a
relevant reference for the conclusions that will be assessed in the following chapter,
namely because it is an indicator composed by the most representative financial
institutions in the Portuguese “banking market”.
As already mentioned, the purpose of the present analysis was to obtain
information and further conclusions about the resilience of the liquidity risk profile of
the Portuguese “banking market” on the short-term path of reform introduced by Basel
III.
3.1 LCR analysis of the financial institution, individually
considered, for each financial period as at 31st December 2013
The first statistical test performed was based in the analysis of the LCR obtained
by the financial institutions in scope, individually considered as of 31st of December 2013,
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namely  through the  analysis  of  the  LCR minimum requirement  –  60% –  was  (or  not)
fulfilled:
·BPI: The bank showed a positive ratio in 7 of the 9 periods analyzed. BPI’s LCR
turned positive in 2007 and after that, it was always above the minimum required
– 60%. The data obtained allowed to identify a positive increasing trend. At 31st
of December 2013, BPI´s LCR was 185% (please see Table 9).
·BCP:  The  bank  showed  a  positive  ratio  in  5  of  the  9  periods  analyzed.  BCP’s
LCR  turned  above  the  minimum  required  in  2009  and  after  that,  it  was  always
above the minimum required – 60%. The data obtained allowed to identify a
positive and slightly increasing trend. At 31st of December 2013, BCP´s LCR was
85% (please see Table 9).
·BES: The bank showed a positive ratio in 4 of the 9 periods analyzed. BES’s LCR
was above the minimum required – 60% – in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011. The
data obtained does not allowed to identify any trend, due to the disparity; At 31st
of December 2013, BES´s LCR was 51% (please see Table 9).
·CGD: The bank showed a ratio above the minimum required – 60% – in all the 9
periods analyzed. CGD’s LCR presents a positive and sustainable trend. At 31st of
December 2013, CGD´s LCR was 177% (please see Table 9).
·STB: The bank showed a positive ratio in 7 of the 9 periods analyzed. BPI’s LCR
turned above the minimum required – 60% – in 2008 (to be noted that 2005 was
also a year on which the LCR was positive) and after that, it was always positive.
The data obtained allowed to identify a positive slightly increasing trend. At 31st
of December 2013, STB´s LCR was 64% (please see Table 9).
According to the LCR values obtained, it was categorically possible to accept H0,
due to fact that all financial institutions in scope (with the exception of BES, where H1
was verify) presents a LCR above the minimum required of 60% on the short-term path
of reform introduced by Basel III.
In fact, at the 31st of December 2013, BES presents a LCR of 51%. Thus, it was
possible to conclude that BES was the only financial institution, of the financial
institutions in scope, which does not have (at the moment) sufficient HQLA stock that
could (in the referred period) be easily and immediately converted into cash (in private
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markets) in order to sustain a significant market volatility or stress scenarios lasting
over 30 calendar days.
On the other side, at 31st of December 2013, there are some financial institutions
that presented a LCR much higher than the minimum required, namely, BPI and CGD,
with LCRs of 185% and 177% respectively. When comparing the referred LCRs to
other LCRs obtained by the remaining financial institutions in scope, this LCR could
represent outliers in the present sample. However, for the purposes of this analysis, we
choose to accept these LCRs based in the assumption that it represents a better
performance in the liquidity management from this two financial institutions.
3.2 Analysis of LCR average ratio presented by the financial
institutions during the full period of analysis
The second statistical test performed was based in the analysis of the LCR
average ratio during the full period in scope. Once more, assuming the minimum LCR
requirement under Basel III standards – 60% –, this analysis allowed to conclude:
·BPI: The bank´s LCR average ratio during the full period in scope was 99%,
which is above the minimum requirement of 60%. Notwithstanding, please take
into account the value obtained by BPI in 2013 (please see Table 9).
·BCP: The bank´s LCR average ratio during the full period in scope was 54%,
which is below the minimum requirement of 60% (please see Table 9).
·BES: The bank´s LCR average ratio during the full period in scope was 60%,
which is equal to minimum requirement of 60% (please see Table 9).
·CGD: The bank´s LCR average ratio during the full period in scope was 98%,
which is above LCR minimum requirement of 60%. Notwithstanding, please take
into account the value obtained by CDG in 2013 (please see Table 9).
·STB: The bank´s LCR average ratio during full period in scope period was 83%,
which is above LCR minimum requirement of 60% (please see Table 9).
Considering the above analysis and the value obtained, it was possible to
categorically accept H0 in  BPI,  CGD and STB case.  Therefore,  we  can  conclude  that
the above mentioned financial institutions had sufficient HQLA stock, that could (in the
referred period) be easily and immediately converted into cash (in private markets) in
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order to sustain a significant market volatility or stress scenarios lasting over 30
calendar days, considering the LCR average ratio during the full period under analysis.
On other hand, in light of the present methodology, the opposite conclusion was stated
for BES and BCP cases, i.e., BES and BCP did not present sufficient HQLA stock that
could (in the referred period) be easily and immediately converted into cash (in private
markets) in order to sustain a significant market volatility or stress scenarios lasting
over 30 calendar days.
3.3 Analysis of LCR of all financial institutions in scope in each
period under analysis
As  previously  mentioned,  we  believe  that  the  analysis  of  LCR  of  all  financial
institutions in scope in each period of analysis represents the most relevant analysis
when the intent is to study in the Portuguese “banking market”, specifically due to the
fact that this indicator is composed by the sum of the LCRs obtained by the financial
institutions which are the most representative in the Portuguese “banking market”.
Therefore,  the  third  statistical  test  performed  was  the  analysis  of  LCR  of  all
financial institutions in scope in each period under analysis against the perception if it
was complying with the minimum LCR requirement under Basel III standards.
The methodology used was based in the computation of the division of the sum of
the HQLA and the sum total net cash flows the financial institutions individually
computed.
Through the average LCR obtained it was possible to observe that the Portuguese
“banking market” started to present a LCR above the minimum required (60%) in 2008.
Since  2008,  this  LCR  was  always  above  the  minimum  required  (please  see  Table  9),
and its trend was always positive, i.e., the LCR obtained in each period increased from
exercise to exercise.
Thus, it was possible to conclude that the Portuguese “banking market” presents
LCR clearly above the Basel III minimum requirement, insofar as the LCR value
obtained was 102% for 2013 (please see Table 9). Therefore, it also can be realize that
H0 was categorically accepted in periods from 2008 further, which allows us to
conclude that, Portuguese “banking market” have sufficient HQLA stock that could (in
the referred period) be easily and immediately converted into cash (in private markets)
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in order to sustain a significant market volatility or stress scenarios lasting over 30
calendar days since 2008. However, the above mentioned conclusion can be skewed
considering the outliers identified in the cases of CGD and BPI (please see above our
comment of the subject). Under the present hypothesis under study – analysis of LCR of
all financial institutions in scope in each period of analysis – it was performed a quick
test, namely through the exclusion of CGD and BPI´s LCRs.
With  this  quick  test  we  were  able  to  verify  that,  even  excluding  the  above
mentioned LCRs values, through the average LCR of the remaining financial
institutions in scope, it was possible to observe that the Portuguese “banking market”
started to present a LCR above the minimum required (60%) also in 2008 (please see
Table 9).  In spite of having a LCR always above the minimum required,  its  trend was
not always positive, i.e., the LCR obtained in each period was not steadily increasing
from exercise to exercise.
Performing  a  one-shot  analysis,  at  31st of December 2013, the Portuguese
“banking market” presented a 102% LCR which is clearly above the Basel III minimum
requirement. Moreover, not considering CGD and BPI´s LCRs, the Portuguese
“banking  market”  obtained  was  68%  (please  see  Table  9),  again  above  the  Basel  III
minimum requirement.
3.4 LCR analysis of all financial institutions in each period under
analysis – HQLA stress scenario
Finally, in the framework of the present dissertation, another statistical analysis
was performed in order to identify which could be the minimum HQLA stock amount
that the Portuguese “banking market” must have in order to present sufficient HQLA
stock that could (in the referred period) be easily and immediately converted into cash
(in private markets) in order to sustain a significant market volatility or stress scenarios
lasting over 30 calendar days.
This analysis was only performed at 31st of December 2013.
According to the previous analysis performed, it was possible to conclude that the
Portuguese “banking market” LCR presented a value of 102% (please see Table 9). In
this sense, assuming that the total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days
items selected for the purposes of the present dissertation remain the equal, i.e., without
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any variation in its amount, it was simulated the Portuguese “banking market” minimum
HQLA stock in order to fulfill the LCR minimum requirement.
Therefore,  it  was  possible  to  verify  that  the  minimum  HQLA  stock  is  Eur
39.187.135 (please see Table 10), which represents a drop of approximately 59% of its
value at 31st of December 2013 (to be noted that the sum of the HQLA stock presented
by the Portuguese “banking market” was Eur 66.524.456 – please see Table 7).
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4. Conclusion
The current financial crisis, marked by the instability and volatility of the
financial markets, may cause relevant issues that the financial institutions management
should take into account on a daily basis. Consequently, we believe that the liquidity
management is a crucial matter that the financial institutions should focus on.
Over the last years, the liquidity risk theory and its consequent practical
applications evolved significantly. The economic growth based on the easy access to
credit created the need of new regulatory tools that may allow managing the liquidity
risk in a more efficient way.
Financial institutions are included in the financial system which is regulated by its
own  rules  and  legislation.  As  a  member  of  the  EU,  Portugal  had  to  implement  the
Directives that led to the implementation of the Basel Methodology and Legislation.
These agreements, issued by the BCSB, established the fundamental principles and
recommendations in the supervision of the banking system and integrated the risk
management issues.
In this framework, the new liquidity requirements form a key part of the Basel III
framework and are intended to strengthen the resilience of global banking institutions.
In  this  case,  the  LCR,  which  will  require  banks  to  hold  (or  not)  a  designated  liquid
assets buffer against a 30-day cash outflow.
The  main  the  objective  of  the  present  dissertation  was  a  preliminary  analysis  of
the new regulatory package of Basel III.
Moreover, the purpose of the present dissertation was to investigate if the most
representative Portuguese financial institutions had sufficient stock of HQLA, in the
period between 2005 and 2013, that could (in the referred period) be easily and
immediately converted into cash (in private markets) in order to sustain a significant
market volatility or stress scenarios lasting over 30 calendar days.
Through the average LCR obtained it was possible to observe that the Portuguese
“banking market” started to present a LCR above the minimum required (60%) in 2008.
Since 2008, this LCR was always above the minimum required and its trend was always
positive, i.e., the LCR obtained in each period increased from exercise to exercise.
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Therefore, it was possible to conclude that the Portuguese “banking market”
presents  LCR  clearly  above  the  Basel  III  minimum  requirement,  as  the  LCR  value
obtained was 102% for 2013. Thus, it also can be concluded that H0 was categorically
accepted in periods from 2008 further.
However, the above mentioned conclusion can be skewed considering the outliers
identified in CGD and BPI cases. Notwithstanding, even excluding the above mentioned
LCRs values, it was possible to observe that the Portuguese “banking market” started to
present a LCR above the minimum required (60%) also in 2008.
In an one-shot analysis, as at 31st of December 2013, the Portuguese “banking
market” presented a 102% LCR which is clearly above the Basel III minimum
requirement. Moreover, not considering CGD and BPI´s LCRs, the Portuguese
“banking market” obtained was 68%, again above the Basel III minimum requirement.
In all the cases, for the purposes of the present dissertation, considering the above
conclusion on the “banking market” (i.e., not only the conclusion obtained on the
financial institutions analyzed individually), it was possible to conclude that the
“banking market” had sufficient HQLA stock that could (in the referred period) be
easily and immediately converted into cash (in private markets) in order to sustain a
significant market volatility or stress scenarios lasting over 30 calendar days.
In a simulated stress scenario, we were able to verify that the minimum “banking
market” high quality liquidity assets stock could drop approximately 59% of its value at
31st of December 2013 and still be in conditions to fulfil the Basel III minimum
requirement (60%).
Through  the  analysis  performed,  we  were  able  to  verify,  categorically,  that  the
Portuguese “banking market” is well prepared for financial stress scenarios, largely due
to the low liquidity risk profile presented in light of the LCR methodology used under
the present dissertation.
Moreover, we also verified that most of the Portuguese financial institutions in
scope were able to adjust their liquidity buffer to the new Basel III liquidity
requirements, which is based on a positive trend identified in the LCR over the period in
analysis. Notwithstanding, the same conclusion could be assessed for a Portuguese
“banking market” through the analysis of the average LCR of the Portuguese “banking
market”.
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The only financial institution in scope that, at 31st of December 2013, presented a
LCR  below  the  minimum  required  in  the  new  Basel  III  requirements  was  BES.
Moreover,  BES´s  LCR  trend  over  the  period  under  analysis  was  always  undefined,
without any remarkable trend. Thus, for all above referred, we were able to conclude
that BES´s liquidity risk profile is high.
In BES´s case, the above mentioned conclusion is in accordance to the latest
events and developments in the Portuguese “banking market”. As is public knowledge,
BES was/is involved in an operation were the bank´s liquidity was low and,
consequently, among other reasons, BES was recapitalized by a special fund of
recapitalization of financial institutions created for this purpose. Prior to this operation,
BES  was  also  one  of  the  Portuguese  financial  institutions  that  had  state  intervention,
through a recapitalized plan implemented under IMF economic and financial
intervention in Portugal, due to liquidity issues and other capital requirements.
In line with the above mentioned, BCP is another Portuguese financial institution
that does not present comfortable LCR values over the period under analysis. In fact,
BCP was one more Portuguese financial institution that had state intervention through
the same recapitalization plan. However, BCP´s case, in light with the LCR
methodology used is not as critical as it is BES´s case.
From a management point of view, we believe that the new liquidity risk
minimum requirements are expected to influence both internal processes and business
models of financial institutions.
Therefore, considering the subject of the present dissertation, we could conclude
that the management of the HQLA stock corresponds to one of the main objectives that
the financial institutions management should be focus on pursuing the Basel III
requirements.
Regarding the LCR, we believe that is important that financial institutions start
programs quickly in order to assess the challenges that they will face in the process of
meeting the new requirements.
Daily frequency and increased granularity have become the new benchmark for
liquidity risk management. This will represent new challenges and financial institutions
will have to quickly identify data and system needs and how to address them better.
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We believe that a detailed study of those challenges should be performed in new
empirical works in order to clearly identify the risks and challenges of the LCR and the
remaining requirements of Basel III.
Consequently,  one  of  the  relevant  issues  in  the  computation  of  the  LCR will  be
the data quality of the elements that will be necessary for the LCR calculation.
Information management, quality and the definition of the necessary information
for  the  calculation  of  the  LCR  are  critical  for  the  ability  of  financial  institutions  in
defining  the  components  of  the  calculation,  as  well  as  for  the  effects  of  the  self
monitorization and support in the activities management and decisions that might cause
changes in the LCR of financial institutions.
On the other side, we stress the fact that financial institutions must focus on
keeping the integrity of the data used, i.e., reports must be based in reliable data and
with a high degree of alignment to sources as the LCR will  be accessible to everyone
(we believe that in this situation, the discipline imposed by the market could help the
financial institutions having a better management of liquidity risk).
Besides integrity levels, we believe that the completeness level is relevant since,
in our opinion, financial institutions must report to supervising entities that must contain
sufficient data to cover the enterprise-level position.
Fundamental information, probably defined by supervising entities will be the
timeliness, more precisely the fact that reports must be generated on a regular basis
following  a  formal  (not  ad  hoc)  schedule.  Reports  should  be  timely  to  the  risks  being
run and demonstrate short generation timelines.
Additionally, we must refer that aligned with the timeliness, reports must also be
flexible. Financial institutions must have the ability to produce reports on demand and
in a flexible way, allowing users to assess emerging risk and facilitating timely decision
making.
Finally, please note that the presented dissertation faced several potential errors
regarding the sampling and methodology definition process. The first potential error
identified lies in the collection and coding of information, which may cause some kind
of bias in statistical analysis since the indicator used for purposes of this investigation
suffered an adaptation in terms of their computation. The second potential error that can
be pointed out is the inadequate coverage of the population (namely due to the selection
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of the only 5 financial institutions). However, we believe that the present error becomes
less important considering the level of market representation which is very high.
Finally, the third potential error in the process is the lack of response of some statistical
units in particular with regard to compliance of the 30 calendar days rule,  from which
one can infer the impossibility of obtaining inferences and conclusions about the
elements of sample.
Given the above mentioned limitations, we believe that these matters could
consist in a solid base for future investigations, such as: i) a future investigation
regarding the LCR components in order to validate if those are the most feasible and if
they express the banks liquidity risk in order to prevent future financial crisis, and ii) a
future investigation, using the same methodology used in the present investigation but
extending the sample,  through the use of data from all Portuguese financial institutions.
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6. Annex - Tables
Table 1. Portuguese financial institutions – Amount of stock HQLA (components) as at 31.12.2012









Banco	BIC 74.895 50.518 13 59.727
Banco	BPI 233.053 175.570 435.270 14.807.920
BPI 163 57.029 96.078 40.629
Millennium	bcp 2.397.317 716.221 1.527.707 11.879.830
Activobank 247 34.612 0 1.972
BII 4 60.634 0 2.343
BIG 14.054 19.699 17.408 700.096
BES 626.558 275.887 1.851.506 9.007.032
Besi 1.067 23.522 840.486 339.974
BAC 3.781 18.333 0 18.639
Best 0 91.039 0 80.990
Finantia 16.547 4.114 90.728 742.113
Invest 4.835 4.761 73.356 211.911
Banif 168.268 78.556 1.097 3.817.234
Banif	Inv 3.257 27.304 114.790 266.324
Banif	Mais 144 1.186 3.897 84.725
CCCAM 433.900 79.338 87 2.130.280
Montepio 247.587 57.370 132.857 6.730.502
CGD 924.055 424.551 2.609.076 17.360.930
CBI 14.541 3.227 869.524 599.797
Finibanco 0 11.749 42.501 0
BBVA 43.061 37.731 91.876 27.324
Itaú 1.441 36.085 440.052 131.512
Popular 171.349 54.743 56.738 1.105.359
Sant	Consumer 44 2.718 1.808 0
Santander	Totta 352.236 333.759 2.332.457 5.102.777
BB 7.826 5.429 0 63.368
Barclays 117.693 166.686 2.293 879.956
BNP 1.756 79.210 0 230.600
BNP	SS 0 1 0 0
Fortis 717 2.794 0 0
TOTAL 5.860.396 2.934.376 11.631.605 76.423.864
S o urc e :  Annual re po rt and ac co unts Individua l TOTAL 96.850.241
Assets
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Table  2.  Portuguese  financial  institutions  -  Amount  of  total  net  cash  outflows  over  the  next  30  calendar  days
(components) as at 31.12.2012







Banco	BIC 233.927 1 436.180
Banco	BPI 4.270.918 338.753 5.861.452
BPI 0 26.863 40.088
Millennium	bcp 12.126.784 1.255.155 5.997.462
Activobank 0 0 1
BII 0 3 8.905.269
BIG 260.248 1.016 6.480
BES 10.238.986 1.630.363 7.138.799
Besi 151.087 714.730 1.242.642
BAC 0 0 10.034
Best 0 27 18.190
Finantia 493.216 127.661 467.002
Invest 228.442 63 7.255
Banif 2.414.205 9.466 933.743
Banif	Inv 334.818 101.871 268.961
Banif	Mais 42.249 0 106.908
CCCAM 1.907.790 452 240.228
Montepio 1.776.514 984 1.125.074
CGD 7.057.438 2.296.505 6.045.877
CBI 216.717 899.787 752.338
Finibanco 0 0 0
BBVA 352.545 82.699 3.002.254
Itaú 0 435.298 625.901
Popular 1.605.143 40.181 1.423.759
Sant	Consumer 348.343 0 534.311
Santander	Totta 5.837.242 2.115.705 2.212.784
BB 0 0 532.693
Barclays 2.464.621 4.520 21.022.437
BNP 0 0 733.788
BNP	SS 0 0 7.153
Fortis 0 0 574.118
TOTAL 52.361.233 10.082.103 70.273.181
S o urc e :  Annua l repo rt and a cc o unts Individua l TOTAL 132.716.517
Liabilities
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Banco	BIC 1% 2% 0% 0%
Banco	BPI 4% 6% 4% 19%
BPI 0% 2% 1% 0%
Millennium	bcp 41% 24% 13% 16%
Activobank 0% 1% 0% 0%
BII 0% 2% 0% 0%
BIG 0% 1% 0% 1%
BES 11% 9% 16% 12%
Besi 0% 1% 7% 0%
BAC 0% 1% 0% 0%
Best 0% 3% 0% 0%
Finantia 0% 0% 1% 1%
Invest 0% 0% 1% 0%
Banif 3% 3% 0% 5%
Banif	Inv 0% 1% 1% 0%
Banif	Mais 0% 0% 0% 0%
CCCAM 7% 3% 0% 3%
Montepio 4% 2% 1% 9%
CGD 16% 14% 22% 23%
CBI 0% 0% 7% 1%
Finibanco 0% 0% 0% 0%
BBVA 1% 1% 1% 0%
Itaú 0% 1% 4% 0%
Popular 3% 2% 0% 1%
Sant	Consumer 0% 0% 0% 0%
Santander	Totta 6% 11% 20% 7%
BB 0% 0% 0% 0%
Barclays 2% 6% 0% 1%
BNP 0% 3% 0% 0%
BNP	SS 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fortis 0% 0% 0% 0%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
S o urc e :  Annual re po rt and ac co unts Individua l
Assets
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Table 4. Portuguese financial institutions - Percentage in the total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days







Banco	BIC 0% 0% 1%
Banco	BPI 8% 3% 8%
BPI 0% 0% 0%
Millennium	bcp 23% 12% 9%
Activobank 0% 0% 0%
BII 0% 0% 13%
BIG 0% 0% 0%
BES 20% 16% 10%
Besi 0% 7% 2%
BAC 0% 0% 0%
Best 0% 0% 0%
Finantia 1% 1% 1%
Invest 0% 0% 0%
Banif 5% 0% 1%
Banif	Inv 1% 1% 0%
Banif	Mais 0% 0% 0%
CCCAM 4% 0% 0%
Montepio 3% 0% 2%
CGD 13% 23% 9%
CBI 0% 9% 1%
Finibanco 0% 0% 0%
BBVA 1% 1% 4%
Itaú 0% 4% 1%
Popular 3% 0% 2%
Sant	Consumer 1% 0% 1%
Santander	Totta 11% 21% 3%
BB 0% 0% 1%
Barclays 5% 0% 30%
BNP 0% 0% 1%
BNP	SS 0% 0% 0%
Fortis 0% 0% 1%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
S o urc e :  Annua l repo rt and a cc o unts Individua l
Liabilities
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Table 5. Financial institutions in scope – Percentage in the total stock HQLA (components) as at 31.12.2012
Table 6. Financial institutions in scope - Percentage in the total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days
(components) as at 31.12.2012








Banco	BPI 4% 6% 4% 19%
Millennium	bcp 41% 24% 13% 16%
BES 11% 9% 16% 12%
CGD 16% 14% 22% 23%
Santander	Totta 6% 11% 20% 7%







Banco	BPI 8% 3% 8%
Millennium	bcp 23% 12% 9%
BES 20% 16% 10%
CGD 13% 23% 9%
Santander	Totta 11% 21% 3%
SUB	TOTAL 75% 76% 39%
TOTAL	-	Average 56%
Liabilities
A m o unts in m Eur
Year BPI BCP BES CGD STB Total
2005 1.852.451 6.831.561 7.355.327 8.906.961 11.640.545 36.586.845
2006 3.108.880 9.164.332 8.830.595 10.949.353 3.644.541 35.697.701
2007 5.167.395 9.505.444 9.870.689 12.188.490 5.871.107 42.603.125
2008 4.040.601 12.575.914 12.187.101 11.607.624 9.724.056 50.135.296
2009 10.759.217 16.772.822 12.526.884 15.613.946 13.150.368 68.823.237
2010 10.166.918 22.114.201 14.923.059 22.633.757 15.819.048 85.656.983
2011 11.754.907 20.722.632 16.881.375 19.387.782 14.426.443 83.173.139
2012 15.651.813 16.521.075 11.760.983 21.318.612 8.121.229 73.373.712
2013 15.013.334 14.654.225 8.114.942 20.807.651 7.934.304 66.524.456
S o urc e :  Annua l repo rt and acco unts Individua l
HQ LA  STO CK
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Table 8. Financial institutions in scope - Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days amount between
2005 and 2013
Table 9. Financial institutions in scope - LCR between 2005 and 2013
A m o unts in m Eur
Year BPI BCP BES CGD STB Total
2005 5.276.352 26.580.109 14.391.869 9.967.208 12.835.852 69.051.390
2006 5.941.703 33.531.680 15.933.470 11.210.432 6.136.521 72.753.806
2007 6.374.213 31.600.903 16.167.274 15.517.329 10.243.980 79.903.699
2008 6.554.067 25.252.198 20.684.637 12.999.139 9.907.901 75.397.942
2009 12.279.446 24.355.052 18.184.105 16.424.229 15.914.168 87.157.001
2010 11.519.395 31.418.679 24.831.947 23.469.557 17.635.340 108.874.918
2011 10.150.248 27.767.171 24.575.398 24.117.056 11.805.222 98.415.094
2012 11.948.110 22.104.224 21.530.753 20.253.807 11.948.687 87.785.581
2013 8.112.560 17.325.765 15.775.963 11.789.012 12.308.591 65.311.891
S o urc e :  Annua l repo rt and acco unts Individua l
TOTAL NET CASH OUTFLO WS OVER THE NEXT 30 CALENDAR DAYS
Year BPI BCP BES CGD STB AverageAll
Average
B C P  B ES
a nd S TB
2005 35% 26% 51% 89% 91% 53% 48%
2006 52% 27% 55% 98% 59% 49% 39%
2007 81% 30% 61% 79% 57% 53% 44%
2008 62% 50% 59% 89% 98% 66% 62%
2009 88% 69% 69% 95% 83% 79% 73%
2010 88% 70% 60% 96% 90% 79% 72%
2011 116% 75% 69% 80% 122% 85% 81%
2012 131% 75% 55% 105% 68% 84% 65%
2013 185% 85% 51% 177% 64% 102% 68%
Average 99% 54% 60% 98% 83% N.A. N.A.
S o urc e :  Own  co ns tructio n
LCR RATIO
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Table 10. Financial institutions in scope – Stock of HQLA minimum in 31.12.2013
A m o unts in m Eur
Year BPI BCP BES CGD STB Total(a)
2013 15.013.334 14.654.225 8.114.942 20.807.651 7.934.304 66.524.456
A m o unts in m Eur
Year BPI BCP BES CGD STB Total(b)
2013 8.112.560 17.325.765 15.775.963 11.789.012 12.308.591 65.311.891
Average
All






39.187.135 (a) / (d) x (c)
HQ LA  STO CK
TO TAL NET CASH O UTFLO WS O VER THE NEXT 30 CALENDAR DAYS
